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In the past decade scholars have put forward 
several scathing criticisms of Chinese labour 
NGOs that go well beyond the usual concerns 
about the lack of transparency and internal 
democracy. Some have criticised them for 
being nothing less than ‘anti-solidarity 
machines’ that, by putting too much emphasis 
on an individualistic view of rights, hinder 
the development of a labour movement among 
Chinese migrant workers (Lee and Shen 2011); 
others have noted how these organisations 
are also working for the benefit of the party-
state, which they assist by minimising social 
conflict and orienting reforms in a way 
acceptable to the authorities (Froissart 2005). 
In a previous article, I myself joined the 
ranks of the critics, highlighting how Chinese 
labour NGOs suffer from a substantial lack of 
‘social capital’, due not only to their strained 
relations with the party-state, but also to the 
considerable difficulties they face in gaining 
the trust of the workers (Franceschini 2014). 
Although these criticisms could be deemed 
ungenerous given the difficulties that these 
NGOs face under the constraints of the 
Chinese political system, they were grounded 
in years of observation and participation in 
the daily operations of these organisations. 
Still, the time may be ripe for a reassessment 
of Chinese labour NGOs.
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In the past decade, scholars have put forward 
several scathing criticisms of Chinese labour 
NGOs that go well beyond the usual concerns 
about the lack of transparency and internal 
democracy. Still, many things have changed 
in the past few years and now the time may 
be ripe for a reassessment of the role of these 
organizations. 
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Since their appearance in China in the mid-
1990s, in spite of their minimal size and lack 
of coordination, labour NGOs have always 
had to face the suspicions of the party-state. 
Already in 2009, an internal document by the 
Guangdong Politics and Law Committee of the 
Communist Party categorised labour NGOs as 
civic agents who intensify labour conflicts, 
carry out covert investigations of factories, 
and receive funding from overseas entities 
to intervene in the ‘contradictions among the 
people’ (renmin neibu maodun), endangering 
social stability, the security of the state, and 
even the international image of the country 
(China Labor News Translation 2010). More 
recently, in February 2015, Li Yufu, Vice-
President of the official union, stigmatised 
labour NGOs for their connections with 
foreign donors (Lin 2015). Noting that ‘the 
trends in the field of industrial relations 
are complex and intricate, and labour 
contradictions have already entered a phase 
of intensification and multiplication,’ he 
denounced the fact that ‘the interferences by 
hostile foreign forces are getting stronger, in 
the futile attempt to use industrial relations 
to break through.’ According to Li, these 
forces ‘resort to some illegal “weiquan” labour 
organisations and individuals to vie with the 
unions for workers, and so doing they break 
the solidarity of the working class and the 
unity of the unions.’
As Jude Howell has noted, what we have 
witnessed in recent years is a paradoxical 
development in which the party-state has 
pursued the ‘incorporation’ of some NGOs for 
welfaristic purposes, while simultaneously 
repressing others (Howell 2015). If the 
attempts at incorporating Chinese labour 
NGOs seem to have been a feature more of the 
latest years of the Hu and Wen administration 
than of the current leadership, repression has 
indeed intensified, reaching a climax last 
December. In the past few years, Chinese 
labour NGOs have been increasingly exposed 
to a wide array of threats and intimidations by 
the state security apparatus. This repression 
has taken many forms. Besides the usually 
non-confrontational praxis of inviting labour 
activists to ‘have a cup of tea’ (he cha), public 
and state security officers have often put 
pressure on landlords to repeatedly evict 
NGOs from their premises and have not 
refrained from liaising with other branches of 
the state (family planning offices, tax offices, 
social security offices, schools, etc.) to harass 
not only the activists, but also their families. 
In the worst cases, this repression took the 
semblance of an authentic police persecution. 
It happened in 2013 to Wu Guijun, a worker 
and NGO volunteer who was detained for 
over a year for joining a strike against the 
relocation of the company he worked in, and 
it happened in the past year to Zeng Feiyang 
and his colleagues (see the briefs on pp. 11, 41, 
and 77 in the present book).
Worth noting is that, while this repression 
eventually led some labour NGOs to shut 
down, many others simply changed name and 
revised their strategies. In the interviews 
that I carried out in 2014 and 2015, most of 
my interviewees stated that the number of 
labour NGOs active in China had grown since 
2012—an annus horribilis in terms of political 
repression—but that the organisations had 
become smaller in size. Even more important 
is the fact that the new organisations that 
emerged in that period were mostly founded 
by activists of NGOs that fell victim to state 
repression. Although they were working 
independently from each other, these activists 
maintained friendly relations with their 
former colleagues, a development that in 
the long run may end up fostering solidarity 
and trust among organisations, laying the 
foundation for a tighter and more effective 
network that may even be able to exert some 
influence at a policy level. From this point of 
view, atomisation is not necessarily is a signal 
of impending annihilation. Still, it remains 
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to be seen whether these new groups will be 
able to survive the latest assault by the party-
state and the new restrictive regulations.
Another significant development concerns 
the way labour NGOs deal with migrant 
workers’ struggles. Until a few years ago, 
labour NGOs steered clear of collective 
disputes and politically sensitive cases—a 
modus operandi which attracted much 
criticism from the international academic 
community. Still, recently some organisations 
have displayed a remarkable willingness 
to engage with labour strikes and protests, 
effectively promoting collective bargaining 
(jiti tanpan) as a tool to solve labour disputes. 
This can be seen not only in many ordinary 
disputes related to unpaid employers’ social 
insurance contributions, severance pay, 
overtime, and housing contribution schemes, 
but also in various high-profile cases that 
involved several hundreds if not thousands 
of workers, such as the Yue Yuen strike in 
Dongguan in 2014 and the struggle of the 
Lide employees in Guangzhou in 2014 and 
2015 (Chen 2015; China Labour Bulletin 
2015). That such events remain politically 
sensitive is proven by the severity of the 
consequences for the activists involved. In 
2014 an NGO worker involved in the Yue 
Yuen strike was detained for a month after 
trying to convince the workers to elect their 
representatives to bargain collectively with 
the management, and Zeng Feiyang and his 
colleagues paid dearly for their involvement 
in the Lide campaign, which was played up 
by the Chinese state media as a case in which 
greedy activists neglected the interests of the 
workers in order to achieve money and fame 
(Zou 2015).
Duan Yi, a prominent labour lawyer based 
in Shenzhen, recently argued that labour 
NGOs are transitioning from ‘service-
oriented’ (fuwuxing) and ‘rights protection-
oriented’ (weiquanxing) to ‘labour movement’ 
(gongyunxing) organisations (Duan 2015). 
Yet, such a conclusion may be premature and 
even dangerous. It is premature because most 
labour NGOs still focus on providing services 
to migrant workers and, at most, deal with 
individual disputes of very limited social 
and political impact, such as cases related to 
occupational health and safety. It is dangerous 
because the term ‘labour movement’ evokes 
spectres of worker upheaval, which have been 
haunting the Chinese leadership since the 
early 1980s. According to my interviews, few 
labour activists identify their organisations 
with the ‘labour movement’ label. As an NGO 
leader in Shenzhen told me:
Some scholars say that we are ‘labour 
movement organisations’. I don’t agree 
completely. I think that it would be more 
appropriate to define us as ‘comprehensive 
organisations’ (zonghexing). Why? Because 
our organisation carries out service work, 
rights-protection work, and even some work 
with strikes simultaneously… Sure, you 
can also talk about labour movement, the 
expression is not bad, but in my opinion it 
is not complete, it doesn’t cover all facets. 
Moreover, this expression easily catches the 
attention of the government. If you talk about 
labour movement, the Party, who started to 
establish itself exactly through the labour 
movement… gets alarmed. Why? Because 
this is the way in which they came to power. 
For this reason, I prefer to use the term 
‘comprehensive’ to define us and the other 
labour NGOs that engage with collective 
bargaining. 
[Interview, September 2015]
Lexical quibbles aside, it is undeniable 
that in recent years some labour NGOs have 
started to experiment with new strategies to 
engage more closely with migrant workers 
and have proved themselves willing to face 
the wrath of the authorities in order to push 
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the boundaries of the political discourse and 
praxis. Although these organisations are still 
far from being ‘independent trade unions’, 
they are becoming more responsive to the real 
needs of migrant workers. In this respect, it is 
significant that the input for this push toward 
collective disputes and collective bargaining 
has come not only from foreign donors (which 
nevertheless played a fundamental role in this 
shift), but also from the workers themselves. 
In this regard, the experience of a southern 
labour NGO established in 2012 with the 
aim of carrying out cultural and recreational 
activities for female migrant workers is 
particularly interesting. As one of the leaders, 
herself an injured migrant worker, told me:
At the end of 2012, many controversies 
between labour and capital arose in the 
factories around us and these female workers 
came to our centre to ask for information… 
During the winter, we organised a meeting 
during which we asked them to vote on what 
kind of activities best fit their interests. They 
chose trainings in law, collective bargaining 
and communication techniques. Their 
choices were completely different from what 
we expected! On this basis, since the end of 
2012, we have rearranged our work, starting 
to deal with the rights of female workers and 
with collective bargaining.  [Interview, April 
2015]
In all likelihood, it was the very fact that 
labour NGOs were increasingly willing to 
deal with collective disputes, engage more 
closely with the workers, and promote a 
confrontational model of collective bargaining 
very different from the official narrative of 
‘collective negotiation’ (jiti xieshang), that 
triggered the latest crackdown against them. 
Organised groups that didn’t work as ‘anti-
solidarity machines’, but actually promoted 
labour organising were highly menacing 
to the party-state and the official union, 
especially in light of the current slowdown 
of the Chinese economy. For this reason, 
Zeng Feiyang and his colleagues, who were 
at the forefront of this new trend, were made 
into a public example for all labour activists 
in China and abroad. Still, although the 
situation in China today is very grim, even 
in this bleak hour there may still be reason 
to look at the future of Chinese labour NGOs 
with some optimism. As described above, 
even in a context of further atomisation of 
these organisations, activists from NGOs 
targeted by state repression are breaking off 
to establish their own groups, a development 
that in the future may foster the emergence 
of a stronger solidarity network. Moreover, 
some activists are also adopting ‘guerrilla’ 
tactics, working on an individual basis and 
bringing aid in areas where no labour NGO 
is present. It remains to be seen how far the 
party-state is willing to go to fight this wave, 
if labour NGO activists will find a way around 
the new restrictions on foreign funding, and 
whether the migrant workers will remain 
silent or will finally start to speak up for those 
who have been risking everything to fight for 
their rights.
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